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We analyzed the highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) 
H5 epizootic of 2016–17 in Europe by epidemiologic and 
genetic characteristics and compared it with 2 previous epi-
zootics caused by the same H5 Guangdong lineage. The 
2016–17 epizootic was the largest in Europe by number of 
countries and farms affected and greatest diversity of wild 
birds infected. We observed significant differences among 
the 3 epizootics regarding region affected, epidemic curve, 
seasonality, and outbreak duration, making it difficult to 
predict future HPAI epizootics. However, we know that in 
2005–06 and 2016–17 the initial peak of wild bird detec-
tions preceded the peak of poultry outbreaks within Europe. 
Phylogenetic analysis of 2016–17 viruses indicates 2 main 
pathways into Europe. Our findings highlight the need for 
global surveillance of viral changes to inform disease pre-
paredness, detection, and control.
Highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) is a zoonotic notifiable disease that can cause high mortality rates 
in most domestic poultry and in some wild bird species. 
Since 2003, HPAI H5 viruses have been circulating in poul-
try in many countries (1). Periodically these poultry HPAI 
viruses have been reintroduced into the wild migratory bird 
population, representing a key risk pathway for its subse-
quent global spread (1–3). However, the effect of HPAI 
infection in both wild and domestic birds is variable and 
often strain-specific. Wild birds, particularly of the orders 
Anseriformes and Charadriiformes, are natural hosts of low 
pathogenicity avian influenza (4).
A passive surveillance system of testing wild birds 
found dead or sick for avian influenza has been in place in 
European Union (EU) member states since 2005 (Commis-
sion Decision 2005/94/EC, replaced with 2010/367/EU), 
with the objective of timely detection of HPAI subtype 
H5N1. Laboratory confirmation of HPAI infection follow-
ing the development of clinical signs (passive surveillance) 
is the primary method of poultry surveillance in the EU 
member states, complemented by a serologic active sur-
veillance program (5).
During epidemiologic year 2005–06 (epidemiologic 
years run from October to September of the next year), 
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HPAI H5N1 clade 2.2 virus of the Guangdong H5 lineage 
spread to a number of countries in Europe, infecting poul-
try and wild bird populations (3). In 2014–15, another vi-
rus of the same lineage, HPAI H5N8 clade 2.3.4.4, was in-
troduced into Europe and associated with variable disease 
severity, including subclinical infection in wild birds and 
domestic waterfowl (6). This H5N8 virus showed unprec-
edented intercontinental spread to the United States and 
Canada and was associated with both wild bird infection 
and, subsequent to local genetic reassortment, large HPAI 
H5N2 outbreaks in poultry (7). 
In October 2016, a novel HPAI H5 clade 2.3.4.4 virus 
of the Guangdong lineage was detected in Hungary and was 
subsequently reported in other countries in Europe, infect-
ing many poultry farms and causing both large-scale and 
sporadic deaths in wild bird populations. The hemagglu-
tinin (HA) gene of this virus was considered phylogeneti-
cally distinct from the previous 2014 clade 2.3.4.4 viruses 
and was nominally suffixed by A (the 2016 clade) or B (the 
2014 clade (8) but this subclade definition requires verifi-
cation by the World Health Organization H5 nomenclature 
group. We describe the epidemiology and genetic charac-
teristics of the 3 major wild-bird mediated epizootics in 
Europe associated with the Guangdong HPAI H5 lineage.
Methods
Epidemiologic Data and Analyses
We collected data from the 3 major HPAI H5 epizootics 
in Europe: HPAI H5N1 in epidemiologic year 2005–06 
(2); HPAI H5N8 in 2014–15; and HPAI H5 in 2016–17. 
For 2016–17, we collected data through July 31, 2017. We 
obtained epidemiologic data from the Animal Disease No-
tification System and the Directorate-General for Health 
and Food Safety, managed by the European Commission, 
and from country notifications sent to the EU Reference 
Laboratory for avian influenza (Animal and Plant Health 
Agency, Weybridge, UK).
We conducted analyses to describe each epizootic, 
examined the geographic and temporal spread (epidemic 
curves), and assessed differences in clinical illness and 
death rates. For spatial analysis, we grouped countries into 
4 regions (North, South-West, South-East, and Central Eu-
rope) on the basis of the broad migration patterns of the 
major migratory water bird species affected by HPAI (on-
line Technical Appendix Figure 1, https://wwwnc.cdc.gov/
EID/article/24/12/17-1860-Techapp1.pdf) (9–14). A full 
description of the methods used is presented in the online 
Technical Appendix.
Viruses’ Sequence Data and Phylogenetic Analyses
We obtained virus HA gene sequence data from coun-
tries’ submissions to the EU Reference Laboratory and 
from GISAID (http://platform.gisaid.org.) We performed 
phylogenetic analyses on HA sequence data from each 
epizootic separately. We used IQ-TREE version 1.5.5 
software (15) to infer maximum-likelihood trees with 
approximate likelihood ratio test (1,000 replicates) and 
bootstrap (100 replicates) support values for branches. 
We down-sampled each dataset using Cluster Database 
at High Identity with Tolerance to remove sequences with 
>99.9% sequence identity (16). We performed root-to-
tip regression analyses using Tempest version 1.5 on the 
downsampled datasets (17). Then, we inferred Bayesian 
phylogenetic trees from each downsampled dataset using 
BEAST version 1.8.4 to determine the mean substitution 
rate and TMRCA (time to most recent common ancestor) 
(18). We annotated the final trees using FigTree version 
1.4.3 (http://tree.bio.ed.ac.uk/software/figtree/). Details 
of criteria and priors used in the analyses are provided in 
the online Technical Appendix.
Results
Epizootic Size  
In 2016–17, a total of 1,108 poultry outbreaks were reported 
in 21 countries in Europe. Extensive farm-to-farm spread, 
predominantly in ducks, seemed apparent in France, which 
had >400 farms affected, and Hungary, with >200 farms in-
fected (19). Conversely, in 2005–06, a total of 230 poultry 
outbreaks occurred in 6 countries, mostly located in Roma-
nia (86%) and Hungary (13%). In 2014–15, only 13 poultry 
outbreaks were reported in 5 countries. The estimated num-
ber of poultry culled was 8 times higher in 2016–17 than in 
2005–06 (Table 1).
The number of wild bird detections was substantially 
different between epizootics: 1,559 incidents in 27 coun-
tries in 2016–17, 487 in 18 countries in 2005–06, and only 
5 in 3 countries in 2014–15. Almost half of the wild bird 
incidents reported in all 3 epizootics were in Germany.
Wild Birds Species and Mass Mortality Events
A total of 49 different wild bird species were reported in-
fected with HPAI H5 virus of the Guangdong lineage in 
2016–17, 28 in 2005–06, and 6 in 2014–15 (Table 2,3). 
Swans (Cygnus spp.), particularly mute swans (Cygnus 
olor), were the most frequent species infected in 2005–
06 (41% of all wild birds) and 2016–17 (20% of all wild 
birds). Ducks were the second most common type of wild 
birds infected. In 2005–06 and 2016–17, tufted duck (Ay-
thya fuligula) was the most frequent duck species detected 
positive (5% of all wild birds). In 2005–06, a total of 28 
(6%) mass mortality events (>5 birds dead in 1 location) 
were reported, whereas 112 (7%) mass mortality events 
were reported in 2016–17; none were reported in 2014–15 
(online Technical Appendix Figure 2). The number of wild 
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birds found dead by incident was significantly different be-
tween epizootics (p<0.001 by Mann-Whitney U test).
Type of Poultry Farm and Clinical Manifestations
The types of poultry infected in each epizootic are shown 
in Table 4. In 2016–17, a large proportion of infected 
farms (40%) kept ducks. In 2005–06, many affected back-
yard flocks in Romania (176/230, 77%) had <100 birds, 
whereas 70% (9/13) of poultry farms infected in 2014–15 
had >10,000 birds and >60% in 2016–17 had >1,000 birds 
(difference in flock size distribution, p<0.001 by Kruskal-
Wallis test). When we excluded Romania from the com-
parison of flock size, there was no statistical difference in 
flock size between 2005–06 and 2016–17 (online Technical 
Appendix Figure 3). 
Ducks, geese, turkeys, and broiler chickens on average 
had higher illness rates in 2005–06 than in the other epizoot-
ics (Figure 1). In 2016–17, average mortality rate was lowest 
in ducks (7%) and turkeys (6%); few farms (<5%) reported 
a >25% mortality rate. In contrast, 32% of affected broiler 
farms and 27% of affected layer farms reported mortality 
rates >25%. In 2005–06, more than half of broiler farms re-
ported mortality rates >25%. When comparing overall esti-
mates, we found the observed poultry illness and death rates 
to be substantially higher in 2005–06 than in 2016–17.
Temporal Spread
We determined the epidemiologic curves of the 3 epizootics 
(Figure 2, panels A–C). In 2016–17, H5 was first detected 
in Europe in a mute swan in Hungary; the first outbreak in 
 
Table 1. Highly pathogenic avian influenza outbreaks by country in 3 epizootics in Europe* 
Country 
H5N1 2005–06 epizootic 
 
H5N8 2014–15 epizootic 
 
H5N8 2016–17 epizootic 
No. 
poultry 
infected 
No.  
wild 
birds 
infected 
No. 
poultry 
culled† 
No. 
poultry 
infected 
No.  
wild 
birds 
infected 
No. 
captive 
birds 
infected 
No. 
poultry 
culled† 
No. 
poultry 
infected 
No.  
wild 
birds 
infected 
No. 
captive 
birds 
infected 
No.  
poultry 
culled† 
France 1 21 11,700  – – – –  485 51 3 1,529,361 
Hungary 29 12 251,948  1 – – 22,000  238 86 5 2,678,191 
Germany 1 220 14,300  5 2 1 58,964  89 738 15 1,150,631 
Bulgaria – 4 –  – – – –  71 13 2 511,832 
Poland – 29 –  – – – –  65 66 – 1,167,282 
Romania 197 17 755,372‡  – – – –  45 93 2 2,222 
Czech 
Republic 
– 14 –  – – – –  38 39 – 79,308 
Italy – 19 –  1 – – 31,985  16 6 – 357,049 
Spain – 1 –  – – – ––  10 2 – 28,330 
Croatia § § §  – – – –  9 12 – 1,546 
United 
Kingdom 
– 1 –  1 – – 6,178  12 23 – 102,849 
Netherlands – – –  5 1 – 245,600  8 48 10 202,004 
Slovakia – 2 –  – – – –  8 58 3 351 
Greece – 25 –  – – – –  5 8 – 28,275 
Serbia § § §  – – – –  4 20 – 289 
Sweden 1 13 692  – 2 – –  4 30 2 203,053 
Austria – 46 
 
 – – – –  2 55 1 1,258 
Ukraine  § § §  – – – –  2 3 1 10,288 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
§ § §  – – – –  1 1 1 148 
Denmark 1 26 102  – – – –  1 49 1 69 
FYROM § § §  – – – –  1 1 – 438 
Belgium – – –  – – – –  2 3 13 4,047 
Finland – – –  – – – –  – 15 2 – 
Ireland – – –  – – – –  – 10 – – 
Lithuania – – –  – – – –  – 5 – – 
Portugal – – –  – – – –  – 1 – – 
Slovenia – 28 –  – – – –  – 41 – – 
Switzerland – 9 –  – – – –  – 87 – – 
Luxembourg – – –  – – – –  – – 4 – 
Totals 230 487 1,034,114  13 5 1 364,727  1,116 1,565 64 8,058,831 
Total infected 717   19   2,745  
*Table includes all reported HPAI H5N8 outbreaks through July 31, 2017. It excludes the new wave of secondary H5N8 outbreaks observed in Italy from 
the beginning of July 2017 through September 2017, which has different drivers and kinetics with maintenance in the poultry (primarily turkey) population 
rather than through wild bird introduction. FYROM, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia; HPAI, highly pathogenic avian influenza.  
†It is uncertain if for some outbreaks only the number of poultry in one farm building or if the poultry population in the area of the farm were reported. This 
estimate should be used as an approximation and indicator of impact. 
‡One observation contained 600,000 birds, representing the overall population of backyard flocks affected in Romania. This number is an approximation. 
§These countries did not submit data to the Animal Disease Notification System in 2005–06; however, there is other evidence of H5N1 incursion in the 
period. 
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poultry was detected 11 days later in a turkey farm, also in 
Hungary. We observed 3 major epidemic peaks on the inci-
dence of poultry outbreaks (Figure 2, panel D): on day 54 
(14.9 outbreaks/wk), following large farm-to-farm spread 
in Hungary; day 79 (12.1 outbreaks/wk) caused by farm-
to-farm transmission in France and Bulgaria; and on day 
121 (16.9 outbreaks/wk), caused by the large farm-to-farm 
spread in France and Poland.
In 2005–06 and 2016–17, a peak in wild bird inci-
dents preceded the peak in poultry outbreaks (Figure 2, 
panel A, C). Statistical analysis of the distribution of the 
epidemic curves indicates that the 2016–17 outbreak had 
significantly higher incidence values (p<0.001 by 2-sample 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test) than the other 2 epizootics; 
2005–06 had significantly higher values (p<0.001 by 
2-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test) than 2014–15. Tem-
poral median of the poultry epizootic was substantially 
different between epizootics (mean/median distance for 
2005–06, 189/223 days; for 2014–15, 33.5/26; for 2016–
17, 92/90 days). Seasonal analysis of poultry outbreaks 
indicates significant differences (p<0.001 by Pearson χ2 
test) between epizootics; >50% of poultry outbreaks oc-
curred in May in 2005–06, in November in 2014–15, and 
in December–February in 2016–17 (Figure 2, panel E).
Spatial Spread
We mapped a temporal-spatial analysis of the 3 epizootics 
(Figures 3–5). The data shown in Figure 5, panel B, suggest 
 
Table 2. Wild bird species of the orders Podicipediformes, Anseriformes, and Charadriiformes, reported by event in 3 highly 
pathogenic avian influenza epizootics in Europe 
Species group Species 
No. (%) events 
H5N1 2005–06 
epizootic 
H5N8 2014–15 
epizootic 
H5N8 2016–17 
epizootic 
Rails Eurasian coot (Fulica atra) 5 (1)  8 (0.5)  
Crested coot (Fulica cristata)   1 (0.1)  
Purple swamphen (Porphyrio porphyrio) 4 (1)    
Common moorhen (Gallinula chloropus) 1 (0.2)  2 (0.1)  
Total 10 (2)  11 (1) 
Swans Unspecified 197 (38) 2 (22) 262 (16)  
Mute swan (Cygnus olor) 92 (18)  344 (20)  
Whooper swan (Cygnus cygnus) 2 (0.4)  80 (5)  
Total 291 (56) 2 (22) 683 (41) 
Ducks Unspecified 57 (11)  143 (9)  
Northern pintail (Anas acuta) 2 (0.4)    
Eurasian wigeon (Anas penelope)  1 (11) 21 (1)  
Mallard (Anas platyrhynchos) 4 (1) 1 (11) 43 (3)  
Common pochard (Aythya farina) 4 (1)  8 (0.5)  
Red-crested pochard (Netta rufina)   2 (0.1)  
Common goldeneye (Bucephala clangula)   1 (0.1)  
Greater scaup (Aythya marila) 2 (0.4)    
Common merganser (Mergus merganser) 5 (1)    
Tufted duck (Aythya fuligula) 18 (3)  82 (5)  
Eurasian teal (Anas crecca)  1 (11) 3 (0.2)  
Smew (Mergus albellus) 1 (0.2)    
Shelduck (Tadorna tadorna)   2 (0.1)  
Common eider (Somateria mollissima)   2 (0.1)  
Total 93 (18) 3 (33) 307 (18) 
Geese Unspecified 30 (6)  94 (6)  
Canada goose (Branta canadensis)   5 (0.3  
Barnacle goose (Branta leucopsis) 1 (0.2)    
Greater white-fronted goose (Anser albifrons)   9 (1)  
Lesser white-fronted goose (Anser erythropus) 2 (0.4)  4 (0.2)  
Greylag goose (Anser anser) 1 (0.2)  21 (1)  
Red-breasted goose (Branta ruficollis) 1 (0.2)    
Bean goose (Anser fabalis)   1 (0.1)  
Pink-footed goose (Anser brachyrhynchus)   1 (0.1)  
Total 35 (7)  134 (8) 
Gulls Unspecified 9 (2)  89 (5) 
 Great black-backed gull (Larus marinus)   11 (1) 
 Herring gull (Larus argentatus) 1 (0.2)  28 (2) 
 Black-headed gull (Larus ridibundus) 1 (0.2) 1 (11) 23 (1) 
 Lesser black-backed gull (Larus fuscus)   1 (0.1) 
 Common gull (Larus canus)   2 (0.1) 
 Total 11 (2) 1 (11) 154 (9) 
Waders Green sandpiper (Tringa ochropus)   1 (0.1) 
 Eurasian curlew (Numenius arquata)   1 (0.1) 
 Total   2 (0.1) 
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that, in the first 2 months of the 2016–17 epizootic, 2 different 
viral incursions may have occurred: one spreading through 
Hungary, Croatia, Switzerland, and southern Germany, and 
another spreading in northern Europe (Poland, Denmark, 
northern Germany, Sweden, and the Netherlands). The 
2005–06 epizootic indicated a similar progression pattern, 
initiating in Romania and spreading up to northern Europe 
and down to southeastern Europe (Figure 3).
Comparison by region of Europe according to wild 
bird migratory patterns indicates poultry outbreaks were 
mostly observed in the South-East and South-West re-
gions in 2005–06 and 2016–17 but in the North in 2014–15 
(online Technical Appendix Figure 4). Most wild bird de-
tections were reported in the North and Central regions. 
Poultry detections by region were significantly different 
for the 3 epizootics (p<0.001 by Pearson χ2 test), whereas 
wild bird detections by region were only significantly dif-
ferent (p<0.001 by Pearson χ2 test) between 2005–06 and 
2016–17.
Phylogenetic Analysis
Genetic analysis of the HA gene for the 2014–15 and 2016–
17 epizootics shows the involvement of H5 clade 2.3.4.4 
in all cases where data were available (Figure 6). Patterns 
found in maximum-likelihood trees are largely in agreement 
with the Bayesian analysis; however, a greater proportion 
of the clades remain unresolved in the maximum-likelihood 
trees (Figure 6; online Technical Appendix Figure 8). The 
 
Table 3. Wild bird species of orders other than Podicipediformes, Anseriformes, and Charadriiformes reported by event in 3 highly 
pathogenic avian influenza epizootics in Europe 
Species group Species 
No. (%) events 
H5N1 2005–06 
epizootic 
H5N8 2014–15 
epizootic 
H5N8 2016–17 
epizootic 
Birds of prey Unspecified 30 (6)    
Buzzard 1 (0.2)  6 (0.4)  
Eagle   1 (0.1)  
Falcon 1 (0.2)  3 (0.2)  
Hawk 1 (0.2)  3 (0.2)  
Owl. 2 (0.4)  4 (0.2)  
Barn owl (Tyto alba) 1 (0.2)    
Peregrine falcon (Falco peregrinus) 1 (0.2)  8 (0.5)  
White-tailed eagle (Haliaeetus albicilla)   24 (1)  
Common buzzard (Buteo buteo) 7 (1)  70 (4)  
Rough-legged buzzard (Buteo lagopus) 1 (0.2)    
Eurasian eagle-owl (Bubo bubo) 2 (0.4)  1 (0.1)  
Eurasian sparrowhawk (Accipiter nisus)   1 (0.1)  
Common kestrel (Falco tinnunculus)   2 (0.1)  
Northern goshawk (Accipiter gentilis)   1 (0.1)  
Total 47 (9)  124 (7) 
Crows Unspecified 1 (0.2)    
Eurasian magpie (Pica pica) 1 (0.2)  4 (0.3)  
Hooded crow (Corvus cornix)   3 (0.2)  
Rook (Corvus frugilegus)   2 (0.1)  
Carrion crow (Corvus corone)   1 (0.1)  
Common raven (Corvus corax)   1 (0.1)  
Total 2 (0.4)  11 (1) 
Grebes Great crested grebe (Podiceps cristatus) 7 (1)  12 (1)  
Little grebe (Tachybaptus ruficollis) 1 (0.2)  4 (0.2)  
Total 8 (2)  16 (1) 
Thrushes Blackbird (Turdus merula)   1 (0.1  
Song thrush (Turdus philomelos)   2 (0.1)  
Total   3 (0.2 
Pigeons, doves Wood pigeon (Columba palumbus)   2 (0.1)  
Collared dove (Streptopelia decaocto) 1 (0.2)  1 (0.1)  
Rock dove (Coumbia livia)  1 (11)   
Total 1 (0.2) 1 (11) 3 (0.2) 
Herons Unspecified 2 (0.4)  16 (1)  
Grey heron (Ardea cinerea) 4 (1)  48 (3)  
Total 6 (1)  64 (4) 
Storks Unspecified 2 (0.4)   
 White stork (Ciconia ciconia)   3 (0.2)  
Total 2 (0.4)  3 (0.2) 
Pelicans Unspecified. (Pelcanus spp.)   2 (0.1) 
Terns Common tern (Sterna hirundo)   2 (0.1) 
Cormorants Great cormorant (Phalacrocorax carbo) 6 (1)  17 (1) 
Other Unspecified 9 (2) 2 (22) 140 (8) 
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2016–17 viruses form a distinct clade and can be clearly dif-
ferentiated from the clade 2.3.4.4. viruses present in Europe 
in 2014–15. In agreement with the geospatial results, analy-
sis of the HA gene of the viruses from the 2016–17 epizootic 
shows that most originate from a common progenitor (time 
to most recent common ancestor estimated May 2014–Au-
gust 2015) (online Technical Appendix Figure 8). However, 
these viruses differ in their evolutionary pathway thereafter, 
evolving in 2 co-circulating subclades without clear geo-
graphic restriction (time to most recent common ancestor 
March 2015–August 2016 [0.9 posterior probability] and 
November 2014–October 2015 [0.82 posterior probability]). 
This finding potentially indicates 2 major incursion path-
ways via wild birds. 
We also found smaller clusters and singleton se-
quences including sequences from European viruses; vi-
ruses from 2014–15 form 1 subclade, estimated to have 
emerged in January–February 2014 (Figure 6; online 
Technical Appendix Figure 8). The 2005–06 data show 
viruses in several subclades, but the branching pattern in 
 
Table 4. Types of poultry on infected farms in 3 highly pathogenic avian influenza epizootics in Europe* 
Type of poultry 
H5N1 2005–06 epizootic 
 
H5N8 2014–15 epizootic 
 
H5N8 2016–17 epizootic 
No. (%) farms  
No. with only 
1 species No. (%) farms  
No. with only 
1 species No. (%) farms  
No. with only 
1 species 
Ducks    3 (23) 0  495 (44) 433 
Geese       113 (10) 81 
Ducks and geese 29 (13) 0       
Turkey 5 (2) 1  3 (23) 0  91 (8) 82 
Broilers 23 (10) 17  4 (31) 0  93 (8) 48 
Laying hens       47 (4) 29 
Pigeons       9 (1) 1 
Guinea fowl       10 (1) 1 
Peacocks       2 (0) 0 
Pheasants       8 (1) 5 
Quail       2 (0) 1 
Ostrich       1 (0) 0 
Backyard† 176 (77) NA       
Unknown    2   360(32) NA 
Total infected farms  230   13   1,116  
*NA, not available. 
†Backyard represents those households that keep few birds, normally layer hens, for their own consumption. The category was used only in the 2005–06 
epizootic. 
 
Figure 1. Morbidity (A) and mortality (B) rates as percentages of populations reported in infected poultry farms during 3 highly 
pathogenic avian influenza epizootics in Europe, 2005–06, 2014–15, and 2016–17. Years given are epidemiologic years (October 
through September of the next year). Diamonds with error bars indicate means and 95% CIs. Asterisks indicate farms with unique 
poultry species used for analysis; dagger indicates large majority of data from backyard farms reported in Romania. 
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this dataset is generally less distinct and many sequences 
remain unresolved.
BEAST analyses (http://tree.bio.ed.ac.uk/software/
beast/) also revealed that the 2014–15 epizootic viruses 
show the highest mean substitution rate (measured per site 
per year), followed by 2016–17 and then by the 2005–06 
epizootic, which is significantly lower (one-way analysis 
of variance p<0.001) (online Technical Appendix Figure 
6). These data are in agreement with the results of the root-
to-tip regression analysis (online Technical Appendix Fig-
ure 7), which show a much steeper slope for the 2014–15 
epizootic compared with the others. However, the spread 
of the data is high for the 2016–17 epizootic, where the 
SD of rates is an order of magnitude higher than that for 
the 2014–15 epizootic and 2 orders greater than for the 
2005–06 outbreak. The nucleotide diversity for each epizo-
otic (online Technical Appendix Figure 9) shows that per-
site diversity (average pairwise nucleotide differences in a 
population) is lowest in the 2005–06 epizootic (0.0038), 
consistent with the lower substitution rate inferred from 
BEAST. The 2014–15 epizootic has the highest diversity 
(0.0086); the rate for 2016–17, calculated from viruses col-
lected through June 2017, is 0.0063.
Discussion
The 2016–17 epizootic of HPAI H5 clade 2.3.4.4 vi-
ruses in Europe has 5 times more outbreaks in poultry 
than observed in the H5 clade 2.2 epizootic in 2005–06 
and 80 times more than in the H5 clade 2.3.4.4 epizo-
otic in 2014–15. This study highlights the unprecedented 
Figure 2. Epidemic curve of 
3 HPAI H5 virus epizootics in 
Europe: A) 2005–06 H5N1; B) 
2014–15 H5N8; C) 2016–17 
H5N8. Years given are 
epidemiologic years (October 
through September of the next 
year). Dashed lines indicate 
number of countries reporting an 
HPAI infection since the beginning 
of the epizootic; vertical line in 
panel C indicates data collected 
through July 31, 2017.  D) Weekly 
average number of poultry 
outbreaks for each epizootic. 
Horizontal lines indicate the day at 
which half of the poultry outbreaks 
have occurred (diamonds); error 
bars indicate 1 SD. E) Number of 
poultry outbreaks for each month 
for the 3 epizootics. HPAI, highly 
pathogenic avian influenza.
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magnitude of the 2016–17 HPAI H5 epizootic in Europe, 
in terms of size (both number of poultry outbreaks and 
wild bird incidents), geographic spread, speed of inci-
dents/outbreaks, and diversity of wild bird species re-
ported infected. As a result, the economic impact is many 
times higher for 2016–17, which resulted in an >8-fold 
increase in poultry that died or were culled.
A greater passive surveillance effort to detect influenza 
virus in wild birds was reported in the EU in 2006 than in 
2016 (20,21). Despite reduced passive surveillance efforts in 
recent years, more virus detections were made in wild birds 
in calendar year 2016 compared with 2006, indicating a like-
ly increase in viral burden within bird populations in Europe, 
leading to an increased risk for incursion into poultry. Al-
though we found a lower rate of substitution and diversity in 
2016–17 compared with 2014–15, the viruses in the 2016–17 
epizootic might be more efficient in capacity to adapt and 
infect avian hosts. Different rates and diversity between 
Figure 3. Geographic and 
temporal spread of the 
2005–06 HPAI H5N1 epizootic. 
A) Location of each incident 
reported. Blue shading indicates 
countries where cases were 
reported. B) Month of first report 
of an HPAI H5N1 incident. Years 
given are epidemiologic years 
(October through September 
of the next year). HPAI, highly 
pathogenic avian influenza.
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2005–06 and the 2 more recent epizootics may be caused 
by overall differences in the H5 lineages (clade 2.2 versus 
2.3.4.4), which could influence viral spread. The greater ge-
netic distances we observed in viruses detected in the 2014–
15 epidemic could also be due to lower sensitivity of surveil-
lance for this virus compared with the other 2 epidemics due 
to an apparently lower mortality rate in wild birds.
Extensive secondary spread is the most probable ex-
planation for the large number of outbreaks reported in the 
farmed duck sector in 2016–17, possibly because of rapid 
attenuation of viral symptoms. Hence, on several farms 
with clinically healthy birds, we detected HPAI infections 
through active epidemiologic tracings and not on the ba-
sis of clinical signs, as reported in data from some mem-
ber states. The results may also indicate that infection and 
transmission between domestic ducks is relatively easy for 
these viruses. The type of husbandry practices and frequent 
movement of birds, coupled with poor biosecurity and lack 
Figure 4. Geographic and temporal 
spread of the 2014–15 HPAI H5N8 
epizootic. A) Location of each 
incident reported. Blue shading 
indicates countries where cases 
were reported. B) Month of first 
report of an HPAI H5N8 incident. 
Years given are epidemiologic 
years (October through September 
of the next year). HPAI, highly 
pathogenic avian influenza.
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of robust hygiene practices, may also make the spread of 
the viruses between farms easier (22).
Swans and ducks were the predominant hosts in-
fected in 2005–06 and 2016–17. Of interest, although 
mallards (Anas platyrhynchos) are the most frequently 
tested in EU passive surveillance (4), tufted ducks (Ay-
thya fuligula) were the most commonly identified species 
of duck with HPAI in 2005–06 and 2016–17. In addition, 
the 2016–17 epizootic demonstrated a much expanded 
wild bird host range compared with previous outbreaks. 
In light of these results, we recommend a review of the 
target species for avian influenza surveillance (5) to im-
prove sensitivity of surveillance. Clarifying the precise 
origins of the current epizootic viruses from reported wild 
bird mortality data is problematic, because these data do 
not allow distinction between migratory carrier species 
and resident sentinel species. Many of the reported spe-
cies are not migratory (e.g., mute swan or little grebes) 
and so might play a role as regional amplifiers of viruses 
but not in long-distance spread (23).
Figure 5. Geographic and 
temporal spread of the 2016–17 
HPAI H5N8 epizootic. A) Location 
of each incident reported. Blue 
shading indicates countries 
where cases were reported. B) 
Month of first report of an HPAI 
H5N8 incident. Years given are 
epidemiologic years (October 
through September of the next 
year). HPAI, highly pathogenic 
avian influenza.
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Figure 6. Maximum-likelihood tree from viral sequences of the 2016–17 highly pathogenic avian influenza H5 epizootic in Europe. 
Circles represent node support values, filled according to approximate likelihood ratio test (alrt) values 0–100. Light gray boxes indicate 
distinct clades with support >50 with isolates from Europe; dark gray boxes indicate clades with <50 or unresolved. Scale bar indicates 
nucleotide substitutions per site.  An expanded figure showing trees for all 3 epizootic years is available online (https://wwwnc.cdc.gov/
EID/article/24/12/17-1860-F6.htm). 
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Epidemic curves for the 3 epizootics were significantly 
different. The incidence values in order of magnitude were 
2016–17 > 2005–06 > 2014–15. In the period of the re-
view, the mean temporal distances to the midpoint in the 
poultry epizootic were different; 2014–15 was relatively 
short, consistent with the incursion into the poultry sector 
and potentially lower virus infectivity present in the wild 
bird reservoir, whereas in 2005–06 and in 2016–17, epi-
demic curves show a clear peak of detection of wild bird 
incidence preceding the peak of poultry incidences, which 
demonstrates the importance of wild bird surveillance.
For the 2016–17 epizootic, the epidemic curve shows a 
long extended tail with small sporadic peaks relating to lo-
calized but limited detection and spread in both poultry and 
wild birds (Figure 2, panel C). These data might suggest 
greater infection pressure from migratory birds in 2016–17, 
leading to higher risks for incursion, greater environmen-
tal contamination, and exposure of local indigenous wild 
bird populations and poultry. The observed spatiotemporal 
relationships between poultry incursions and wild bird de-
tections represent a complex dynamic. Exploration of the 
epidemic curves by country in 2016–17 shows important 
differences that relate to the type of poultry production in-
fected (online Technical Appendix Figure 7). For example, 
we detected infections in Hungary relatively early in the 
epizootic; their rapid peak and decline may reflect exten-
sive infection within the major duck-producing regions and 
less susceptible populations through infection and depopu-
lation. In contrast, infection in Germany and Poland was 
more consistent and may reflect a more continuous expo-
sure and incursion risk into a variety of poultry sectors.
The viruses showed close genetic similarity to viruses 
contemporaneously circulating in Central and Southeast 
Asia. The lower genetic diversity observed in 2016–17 
was accompanied by reassortment of all gene segments, as 
shown in previous studies (8,24,25). The high reassortment 
observed in the 2016–17 epizootic also resulted in novel 
NA reassortants such as the H5N6 and H5N5 viruses. The 
H5N6 viruses circulating in Europe were a reassortant of 
HPAI H5N8 and classical European LPAI present in wild 
birds (data not shown). We can clearly differentiate the ge-
netic characteristics of this strain from viruses known to be 
circulating in poultry and wild birds in the Far East with 
occasional spillover to humans.
Epidemiologic results suggest 2 broad corridors of vi-
rus incursion in 2005–06 and 2016–17, through northern 
and central Europe with subsequent spread, later corrobo-
rated through phylogenetic analyses of the HA gene of the 
viruses from the 2016–17 epizootic. This dual incursion 
probably relates broadly to known postbreeding move-
ments of northern duck species, which breed widely across 
northern Eurasia (11,13,26). These movements occur on 
a broad front, but ringing recoveries and other analyses 
demonstrate movements from breeding areas from Sibe-
ria both southwest toward the Black and Aegean Seas and 
ultimately the coastal wetlands of the eastern Mediterra-
nean, and further north and west through the Baltic Sea to 
coastal and other wetlands of the southern North Sea and 
northwestern countries (11–14). These represent migratory 
tendencies only; several studies have shown the high-level 
complexity of these movements and their variation due to 
both short-term weather patterns and longer-term climate 
change (27,28). The fact that these corridors were appar-
ent in 2 temporally distant epizootics suggests the need for 
further research to focus surveillance in these areas.
This study presents many limitations (online Techni-
cal Appendix). Differences in the implementation of pas-
sive wild bird surveillance between countries, which are 
implied in the EU avian influenza annual report for 2016 
(20), suggest that sensitivity of wild bird surveillance var-
ies across countries (29), which could affect the distribu-
tion of cases we observed. The true probability of detect-
ing HPAI is dependent on many factors that may influence 
both the frequency of wild bird deaths and the likelihood 
of identification and sampling of wild bird carcasses in dif-
ferent regions and countries. Public awareness, the current 
avian influenza status of the country area, media coverage, 
prevailing climatic conditions, available food sources, and 
removal by predators may affect wild bird mortality, detec-
tion rates, or both (30). Furthermore, the efficacy of pas-
sive surveillance is difficult to measure because capturing 
the expended effort depends on observation and testing of 
deceased birds. On the other hand, surveillance has high 
sensitivity in farmed poultry, mainly because of higher vir-
ulence and much closer observation of these populations.
Despite apparent heavy infection pressure in wild birds 
in 2016–17, the virus was not detected early in the epizo-
otic in areas in eastern Europe, such as the Danube Delta, 
with high density of early migratory waterfowl. There were 
significant incursions in poultry in northern Europe, par-
ticularly Germany and Poland, and these areas also report-
ed the greatest number of infected wild birds. This finding 
may reflect the implementation of enhanced surveillance 
in wild bird populations rather than true increased risk. 
Southwestern Europe had relatively few wild bird detec-
tions compared to the number of poultry outbreaks, per-
haps because of the establishment of the virus in the duck 
production sector in southwestern France, not as a result of 
increased introductions from wild birds (31).
The extent of the 2016–17 H5 epizootic indicates an 
urgent need to reappraise the effectiveness of surveillance 
strategies in both wild and domestic birds and to monitor 
key populations for emergence of viral variants. The dif-
ferences we observed in the 3 epizootics illustrate the dif-
ficulty of predicting HPAI epizootics. However, the tem-
poral peak of wild bird detections preceding the peak of 
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poultry outbreaks at the EU level highlighted the utility of 
surveillance in wild birds, as observed in other studies (29). 
The spatial corridors of HPAI we identified may provide 
the basis for an increase in targeted surveillance to improve 
system sensitivity. Although the H5N8, H5N5, and H5N6 
European-reassortant viruses have not been shown to infect 
humans and remain avian influenza–like strains with no 
evidence of key mammalian adaptation markers (27), their 
genetic volatility represents a potential threat that requires 
continuous monitoring and surveillance of virus incidence 
and genetics to continue to protect public safety.
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